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The extensive Eisenhower era highway system is reaching the end of its lifespan and will require a large 
investment in the coming years to keep functioning. History as shown that this extensive highway system is not 
solving the accessibility problems of our modern cities. Public transportation is making a resurgence as a potential 
solution. However, with little political willingness to downsize the system most of the Highway Trust Fund revenues 
are going toward the highway account, leaving public transportation systems with little money to expand. For the 
public transportation to strive, it either requires extra funding or it needs to be more efficient. This paper examines the 
correlation between transit system privatization and efficiency. The paper uses a series of regressions to determine if 
the efficiency, measured by the ratio of total operating expenses by vehicle revenue hour, is affected by the type of 
service (Directly operated, purchased transportation or mixed). The methodology is an update of McCullough’s 
(1998) as it uses 2009 to 2013 data and introduces a variable to control for competition in the market. The results 
show that purchased transportation seemed to be associated with greater efficiency of the systems. Competition in 
the market is also significant and might be the real explanation behind purchase transportation being meaningful. 
However, when looking at the financial impact, the real driver of efficiency is scheduling.  
This research is a comprehensive look at the relationships between transit systems privatization and cost 
efficiency. The first part of this research investigates the complex nature of privatizing bus services and highlights key 
factors of privatization that affect cost efficiency. A few cases from U.S. public transportation agencies and the U.K. 
deregulation policies from the 1980s are looked at. In the second part, the findings from the literature review are used 
to build a multiple regression model explaining the effect of several variables on agencies’ cost efficiency. The 
hypothesis used to build the model is that purchased transportation and competition in the market contribute to a 
better cost efficiency. 
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History of transit funding 
Gomez-Ibanez (2003) in his cycle of transit system life, explains how transit systems tend to go through the 
following ten phases: 
1. Entrepreneurial  
2. Consolidation 
3. Regulation of fares and franchises 
4. Decline in profitability 
5. Withdrawal of capital and services 
6. Public takeover 
7. Public subsidies 
8. Declining efficiency  
9. Dilemma of subsidy cuts, fare increases, and service cuts 
10. Privatization. 
As explained in the history section (Section 2 - American Transit History) of this literature review, most of the 
transit systems in the United States are currently somewhere around phase 8 or 9. That includes the Metropolitan 
Atlanta’s Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA). While several scenarios can happen, privatization is more and more often 
looked at as a way to drive efficiency up and reduce the amount of subsidies needed. The main concern with 
privatization is equity for the people in need of transit. Public transportation is often seen as a public good but is not 
technically one when looking at its economic definition. Section 3 (The Economic Argument for Privatization) makes 
the economical case for privatization and can be summarized by “a private management, motivated by the possibility 
of profit it is hoped, will have stronger incentives to control costs and thereby reduce or eliminate the need to support 
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the former state-owned enterprises and contracting or state supplied with scarce government tax revenues” (Gomez-
Ibanez and Meyer 1993). Section 4 (System Privatization Impact Assessment) describes the pros and cons found in 
the literature when it comes to privatization. Finally, London is taken as a successful example of conversion to a 
privatized system. The last section will draw conclusions on privatization and recommend a set of data to collect to 
perform a multiple regression and test the hypothesis that agencies contracting out their local bus service are more 
cost efficient than public transit agencies that keep all of their operations in-house. 
Since the late 1980s and until the advent of the private automobile, public transportation whether it was by 
horse-drawn carriages, streetcars or buses was the way to get around in most of the American cities. Often transit 
systems were going far beyond the boundaries of our current transit systems (Rodrigue 2013). Affordable and 
frequent, transit was used by people of all classes. Public transportation was then privately owned and operated but 
publicly regulated (Beimborn and Puentes 2005). Each operator paid the city for the use as well as wear and tear on 
the public roads. In the mid-1900s, after several decades of glory, privately owned transit companies entered an era 
of decline. Shortly after World War II, the automobile became affordable and cities started to sprawl out to the 
suburbs. One of the reasons for the success of the streetcars was also the underpaid labor (Gomez-Ibanez and 
Meyer 1993). Inflation rose rapidly and made operations less profitable by raising the operator’s wages (Jones 2010). 
The ridership started to decline and so did the revenues (Wachs 1989). As a result, the Federal Government started 
to step-in to regulate public transportation and shift from a private ownership to a public ownership (Beimborn and 
Puentes 2005).  
The 1960s 
In 1961, Congressional approval of the Housing Act allowed modest loan programs to assist ailing commuter 
railroad companies (Hess and Lombardi 2005). Gradually, transit became public and required its own federal funding. 
In 1964, federal transit programs went from the Department of Commerce to the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. The Urban Mass Transportation Act authorized $2.3 billion over 3 years in discretionary federal grants 
to cover up to two thirds of capital cost for the construction, reconstruction, or acquisition of transit facilities and 
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equipment (Hess and Lombardi 2005). While public transit was already declining, this attempt encouraged cities to 
build up their transit system. In 1968, Federal transit programs moved under the Department of Transportation. That 
is when the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) that would later become the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) was created (Hess and Lombardi 2005). 
The 1970s 
By 1970, most cities were running their public transportation and funding was needed to maintain and operate 
the systems built using UMTA money. The Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act (UMTAA) was voted to bring 
more funding to transit. Transit ridership was already declining rapidly, labor cost and fuel cost were rising leading to 
an inevitable transit service retrenchment in most U.S. cities (Altschuler and Luberoff 2003). In 1973, the Federal-aid 
Highway Act authorized highway funds to be more flexible and to allow use for non-highway capital projects. In 1974, 
after the strong lobbying of the transit industry, the National Mass Transportation Assistance Act was passed to 
secure funds for operating expenses. It boosted funding for discretionary gran. Funds were also distributed to urban 
areas on a formula basis and the 50% match for operating costs was used to defray maintenance and labor costs 
(Weiner 1999). 
The 1980s 
Between 1970 and 1980 the farebox recovery went from 70% to 30%. In 1982, the Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act introduced a 1p per gallon share of the gasoline tax. That revenue was transferred to the mass transit 
account of the highway trust fund to be used for the discretionary grant program (U.S. Congress 1982). In the same 
decade, the federal government decides to cut transit funding by 20% and the discretionary grant program was split, 
40% for rail starts and extensions (New Start program), 40% to rail modernization, 10% to major bus project and 10% 
to discretionary funds. At the end of the 1980s, public transportation went from flourishing and private to public and 
struggling for money. While the automobile was making its way to American households, the federal government 
tried to encourage the development of transit systems by allocating large amount of money through discretionary 
grants. However, ridership was declining rapidly and the newly built systems quickly ran out of operating and 
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maintenance money while the federal government started to drastically cut funding. The financial burden was then 
gradually shifted to the local governments. 
The 1990s 
Despite the worsening of public transit systems, the 1990s have seen two major transportation bills the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA, 1991) and the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st 
Century (TEA-21, 1998). These bills aimed at leveling the playing field between highway and transit funding by 
making it more certain, easier and flexible. More power was given to local governments (Beimborn and Puentes 
2005). Between 1965 and 1996 operating costs in the public transportation industry have increased by 397% 
compared to an inflation rate of only 201%. Public transportation was the industry with the costs increasing at a faster 
rate than any other industry. As a result all of the revenues and subsidies were spent on operations and maintenance 
leaving nothing for expansion (Cox and Love 1996). 
Post 2000 
In 2005, George W. Bush signed into law the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: a 
Legacy for Users (Young 2005). The bill provided some record funding for transit including funds for the New Start 
and New Freedom programs. Both programs allocate funds for new transit systems and extensions. After the bill 
expired in 2009, it was renewed several times until Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) was 
passed in 2012 (Beimborn and Puentes 2005). MAP-21 streamlines the environmental review process to make 
project development faster. Some of the funding for pedestrian and bicycle was cut down and consolidated into a 
broader program “Transportation Alternatives”. More of the fund is transferred to the local Metropolitan Planning 
Organization (Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century 2012). 
The brief review of transit funding shows how transit was originally mostly private and successful. It then 
declined mostly due to the democratization of the automobile. The government, despite trying to encourage building 
out new transit systems, created an unleveled playing field between highway funding and transit funding (Beimborn 
and Puentes 2005). Soon after the incentive of building large systems was given federal funds were reduced leaving 
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the cities struggling for money to operate their system. More and more power is passed to the local authorities to 
operate and fund their systems. Public-private partnerships, infrastructure banks and the Transportation 
Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act are more frequent to help funding transit systems. 
The Economic Argument for Privatization 
At the federal level, funding for transit is scarce. The gas tax that provides most of the money for the Highway 
Trust Fund has not changed since 1993 (Haven 2013) despite the increase in labor cost and decrease in gas tax 
revenue. The recent high inflation rate and better efficiency of cars have led to a reduction of the Highway Trust Fund 
(HTF) revenues. For each gallon of gasoline purchased 18.4 cents go to the HTF. Among these 18.4 cents, only 2.86 
cents are allocated to the Transit Account. Confronted to the disregard of policy makers for transit, local governments 
and transit agencies explore new sustainable funding strategies for transit.  
Imus, Baxandall and Christensen (2007) recognize seven principles for transit funding. It should enhance 
market efficiency and internalize the external costs. It should have a low collection cost. It should be reliable over 
time. It should have several sources rather than one. The approach should be ‘How much can we charge before we 
start losing ridership’ rather than a maximizing farebox recovery approach. It should be transparent and it should 
engage stakeholders. These principles highlight the importance of efficiency as well as the need for several sources 
of funding. 
There is an extensive literature about funding streams proposals such as the 18 solutions of Litman (Litman 
2014). Some of the solutions proposed include the traditional fare increases, taxes (property, sales, fuel, vehicle-km), 
advertising as well as some other that are not as widespread such as a levy on employees’ wage, development 
impact fees or land value capture. While funding is critical, efficiency of the transit sector is also important. 
Privatization is often seen as a way to maximize efficiency but is rarely considered for public transportation in the 
U.S. One aspect of the funding problem for transit is to find the resources to pay for operations and maintenance but 
the other aspect that is not considered as often is ‘How can we make our operations more efficient? Highway funding 
begins to look at privatization for congestion pricing and dial a ride services. Several American cities contracted out 
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these services to the private sector. The main arguments for non-privatization of transit systems are the equity 
problems that could arise as well as the fact that public transportation is considered as a public good. That is, non-
excludable and non-rivalrous. Public goods are often provided by public monopolies. However, with monopolies 
consumers pay more for the service and get less out of it. Monopolies do not achieve market efficiency and interests 
of the service provider are favored to the interests of the consumer (Cox and Love 1996). Competitive markets seem 
to be what transit agencies want to aim for to lower costs and increase efficiency.  
The following section looks at the pros and cons of privatization. Privatized transit is how transit started. Transit 
was then popular and used (4 – System Privatization Impact Assessment) by people from all classes and 
background. Why would that not hold true nowadays? 
System Privatization Impact Assessment 
This section looks at the advantages and disadvantages of privatized bus systems. The studies that were 
reviewed include systems that were either entirely privatized and ownership was transferred or others with partial 
privatization with agencies contracting out part of their service. In 2003, almost 40% of the 518 U.S. public transit 
agencies providing bus transit were contracting at least some of their service. When thinking about privatization or 
contracting out it is important to think about what type of service is concerned. Gomez-Ibanez distinguished between 
intra-urban service, radial (suburb to work trips) and inter suburban trips (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993). Some 
types of service are more tailored for privatization than others. For instance, if inter suburban routes are privatized 
there are high chances that operators will either not enter into contract or price the service really high due to the 
potentially low revenue per mile of the route. 
Advantages 
As mentioned before, introducing competition allows an increase in efficiency by balancing the market forces. It 
was reported that cost savings could be as high as 30% and some studies even mention 60% (Bladikas et al. 1992). 
Colorado was mandated in 1984 to contract out at least 20% of its system following an FTA requirement, the savings 
observed were of 31% using fully allocated costs (McCullough, Taylor, and Wachs 1998). One of the explanation 
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often cited for this increase in efficiency are the savings in labor cost and optimized utilization of the vehicle fleet. In 
the case where privatization is partial, it was observed that agencies contracting out some of the work became 
themselves more efficient (McCullough, Taylor, and Wachs 1998). In his study Babitsky looked at thirteen cases of 
private ownership in public transportation (Perry and Babitsky 1986). Six of the cases showed that private ownership 
was more efficient than public ownership, four cases showed opposite conclusions and the rest did not have a 
difference in efficiency. One of the major problems in the studies looking at difference in costs following a 
privatization are the correlation between the contracting decision and the cost efficiency, the non-differentiation 
between agencies that are entirely privatized and these that are only contracting out part of their service and finally 
the short length of time used for the studies. Iseki addressed all of these caveats in his research (Iseki 2010) and 
found that under particular conditions including competitive bidding, well-designed contracts and adequate 
management of the contractors privatization was more effective. Iseki highlighted that often ‘contracting solves the 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness of publicly provided service caused by the swollen bureaucracies with redundant 
staff; high labor costs due to stringent work rules and limited use of part-time workers; and political pressure to 
provide service regardless of whether it is cost-efficient or cost-effective”. Iseki found lower cost savings between 5% 
and 8% depending on the situation and the privatization model. Gomez Ibanez and Meyer looked at Denver and 
Houston among other cities that complied with the FTA requirement regarding contracting out (Gomez-Ibanez and 
Meyer 1993). The study finds that in general private firms are more efficient than public agencies, however the two 
authors did highlight the difficulty to control for other variables that might influence costs. They identified specifically 
four areas of cost savings, lower wages for drivers, lower driver fringes, lower overheads and lower maintenance 
costs.  
Disadvantages 
Numerous studies also raise concerns regarding potential disadvantages of having privatized or contracted out 
systems. It was noted that cost savings sometimes come at the expense of labor. Benefits for employees tend to be 
lower and their working hours longer. In Denver, drivers on routes that were contracted out were paid only 77% of 
what their public counterpart were (Peskin, Mundle, and Varma 1992). Threats of privatization cause labor to accept 
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lower working conditions whether it is in the public or private sector. It was highlighted that public agencies have a 
greater concern to keep the fares down and attract more customers compared to contracted-out routes that operate 
mostly on routes that are already heavily travelled on. Iseki is also concerned about the real administrative cost of 
managing the contractors when the service is not entirely privatized (Iseki 2010). In addition, poorly managed 
contracts that are not renegotiated often enough or enforced without meaningful performance indicator could lead to 
a decrease in efficiency. One the major concern for policy makers and regulators when considering privatization is 
the equity problems that could arise. Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer emphasized on it (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993). 
The assumption is that by introducing competition, low density communities will be disregarded and competition will 
occur only on a few profitable routes confusing customers with services redundancies and eventually encouraging 
auto use. Gomez-Ibanez also mentioned that private operators might care less about the quality of the service 
provided.  
Conclusions 
Studies seem to indicate that introducing privatization leads to more efficient transit systems, between 5% and 
61% depending on the cases. Private entities are performance driven to maximize their return on investment while 
public entities tend to be less result oriented and more focused on service. In order to get a successful system both 
of these values should be integrated. It appears that one of the best way is to have a public entity managing the 
privatization to contractors while also keeping the service consistent and customer oriented through well-thought 
contracts. Each time a new service is added, transit agencies have to evaluate whether it is cheaper to do it in house 
or to contract it out. The bidding system when associated with well explained contract terms ensure that the service 
will be delivered in a way that is acceptable with the values of the transit agency. With the efficiency gained from 
contracting out the money saved along with the remained subsidies can help funding service routes that are lifeline 
service and that cannot be profitable. Some argue that these type of service should be subsidized by another branch 
of the government than transportation such as social services for example. Another important aspect that was 
emphasized by Cox and Love is the necessity for transparency in the privatization process. All parties should have 
access to all information for a fair and healthy competition environment (Cox and Love 1996). One problem that is not 
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really addressed in the studies is the decrease of working conditions and benefits for bus drivers. All privatization 
plans inevitably lead to drivers being worst off. This should be carefully considered when planning on going private. 
The key element for success is the careful monitoring of the contracting out and monitoring of the contractors. The 
following section is a brief case study of the London that started privatizing its service in the 1980s and that is 
considered one of the privatization success story. 
Case Study of Great Britain 
History of London Transit 
Before 1984, public transportation was managed by London Transport (LT) and was reporting to the Greater 
London Council (GLC) since 1969. Between 1970 and 1982, London found itself losing riders to the automobile and 
entrenched in inflation leading to operating costs going up by two thirds (Kennedy 1995). That corresponds to step 4 
(Decline in Profitability) in the Gomez-Ibanez cycle introduced in section 1. In the meantime grant payment went up 
from 6.5 Million to 370 Million. Between 1966 and 1984 the farebox recovery ratio went from 93% down to 58% 
(London Council 1985). In 1984, the London Regional Transport Act introduced a tendering system for the city of 
London to attempt saving the system. Following the Transportation Act, London Transport became a nationalized 
body and its control was transferred from the Greater London Council to the Secretary of State with the duty of 
providing public transport to the Greater London. The goal established for the remodeled agency was to reduce the 
subsidies by half the amount in three years and to increase service quality as well (Kennedy 1995). London 
Transport was also mandated to set up a company for providing public transportation, London Bus Limited (LBL) was 
then created.  
The Tendering Process 
London Transport Tendered Bus Division decided which route or set of routes to put out to tender. 
Specifications were detailed such as the bus capacity, the headway, the street and stands to be used for the service 
etc. Private operators then submitted sealed bids based on the service specification. The bid equaled the cost of 
providing the proposed service. Private operators could also suggest different bids with slightly different 
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specifications. London Bus Limited was also allowed to bid following the same rules as the private operators. It was 
required that all the bids estimate should yield a 5% minimum rate of return on turnover. The operator winning the 
bidding stages enters a three years contract monitored by the Tendering Bus Division. Any deviation from the 
contract could lead to financial penalties and termination of the contract (Kennedy 1995). Cost overrun were not 
subsidized and underperformance was deducted from the contract (Kennedy 1995a). 
The Results of Privatization for London 
Outcomes of the privatization are mixed. In terms of cost savings, Kennedy and Domberger observed 
significant decrease of operating costs when contracting out the service (Kennedy 1995). A regression was 
performed looking at cost as a function of bus velocity, age and size. The result was a saving of 18% and of 14% 
after administrative cost were deducted. Further cost savings were achieved through optimization in labor costs. 
Stakeholders’ impact was also looked at. In general, workers in the industry were disadvantaged after privatization. 
Earnings were lower for bus drivers. The bus manufacturing industry had less orders due to operators stretching the 
life of their vehicles. The tax payers came out better-off with less taxes to pay due to a reduction in subsidies. The 
bus users were affected differently depending on where they lived. Overall there has been a decrease in patronage, 
however that could be attributed to people switching for automobiles as they become more affordable. Overall it was 
considered as a positive experience to privatize the system (White 1990). Interviews in Kennedy’s studies mention 
that the simple process of restructuring the public entity to accommodate bus tendering allowed to streamline and 
make the agency more efficient resulting in cost savings (Kennedy 1995a). The heavily monitored tendering system 
organized by the public agency contributed to the efficiency of the system as well as allowing to retain equity in the 
system with an emphasis on customer service instilled by the public agency. As observed by Preston & Almutairi, 
‘competition for the market is preferable to competition in the market’ (Preston and Almutairi 2014). This way it is 
ensured that bids will obey the market law and be priced correctly while retaining customer focus by not having 




Overall it seems that privatization in the form of contracting out bus service could be more efficient. It seems 
clear that cost savings could be achieved however to what extent is a question still to be answered. When Gomez-
Ibanez compared the UK and the USA he found a lot of similarities to the exception of the United States being more 
productive now than the United Kingdom was then. Therefore productivity will be achieved better in matching the 
system to demand more closely (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993).The United States’ transit is more subsidized than 
the United Kingdom’s transit was therefore it is further away from viability. The level of auto ownership is also very 
different between the two countries. In the U.S. more people own car and the transit culture is lesser. 
It is clear from the literature review that many factors come into play when evaluating the effectiveness of 
contracting-out bus services. McCullough et al. (1998) study provided an interesting analysis of the relation between 
the type of contracting and the cost-efficiency. McCullough’s research will be updated and furthered by looking at the 
impact of competition on cost efficiency. As mentioned by Preston and Almutairi (2014) competition could be a major 
factor affecting an agency’s efficiency. 
METHODOLOGY 
This paper uses McCullough et al’s (1998) methodology as a starting point to show a potential evolution in how 
the type of service (Purchased, Directly Operated or Mixed) affects efficiency as well as taking it further by the 
introduction of new variables to refine the model. The hypothesis for this research and that is being tested is ‘Are 
agencies that have some or all of their buses operations contracted out more efficient than agencies that directly 
operate all of the entirety of their bus service ?’. The new parameter introduced in this study is the presence of 
competition in the market. McCullough, after failing to demonstrate a correlation between the type of service and the 
efficiency of an agency, stated that efficiency might be driven by competition more than by the type of service. This 
hypothesis was also tested. The scope of this study is limited to local buses and does not include shuttle or 
paratransit services. McCullough et al. (1998) built a model to better define the relationships between efficiency and 
type of service ownership using the following variables: 
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 Cost efficiency 
 Vehicle scheduling 
 Labor utilization 
 Cost-of-Living 
 Agency size 




 Population Density 
 Precipitation 
 Population 
 Service Area 
 Peaking 
 Contracting 
Table 1- McCullough's Original Regression Model 
This data was re-collected for 68 agencies across the U.S. (See Appendix A). In order to be selected for the 
data set, the agencies had to have over 100 buses in operation and should not have changed their Type of Service 
(TOS) between 2009 and 2013. The TOS is defined as either ‘Directly Operated’ (DO), ‘Purchased Transportation’ 
(PT) or Mixed. ‘DO‘ and ‘PT’ are the abbreviations used by the National Transit Database (Federal Transit 
Administration 2015) while ‘Mixed’ describes agencies that have a combination of purchased transportation and 
directly operated transportation. The dataset comprises 38 agencies that directly operate their buses (DO), 11 that 
completely contract-out (PT) and 19 that do a bit of both (Mixed). Appendix B contains the list of each agencies along 
with a few of their attributes, including the type of service. 
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Since the paper was written in 1998, APTA stopped reporting a number of variables which prevents from totally 
recreating the data set McCullough et al. used. Consequently, the speed and vehicle size data is not included in this 
research but should not create any changes in the dataset as the study only looks at local bus service which is 
composed for the most part the trips of 40-feet buses within city limits. The contracting data collected is not recorded 
as the number of hours contracted-out but rather as a set of three dummy variables describing the nature of the 
contract. The number of hours contracted out matters much in this study, what is tested is whether or not there is an 
influence of the type of service on efficiency but not the intensity of the effect. The labor utilization measure was not 
utilized because it is only available for agencies that directly operate their buses. 
All other variables were collected and averaged over a 5-year period (2009-2013) as it was done for the 1989-
1993 by McCullough (1998) to avoid anomalies in agencies’ operations skewing the dataset. The cost efficiency, 
used as a dependent variable, is the ratio of total operating expenses by vehicle revenue hour. The higher the value 
the more expenses per hour the agency is facing. The farebox recovery ratio was also added as an alternative 
efficiency measure. The farebox recovery ratio was not included in McCullough’s studies, it was considered that the 
farebox recovery ratio was too closely related to the amount of demand for the service and therefore would not be a 
true measure of efficiency. However, for this study it was decided to be included in the regression as a measure 
reflecting how much of the expenses are covered by fares.  
The vehicle scheduling measure is a ratio of total vehicle-hours by vehicle revenue hours and gives a sense of 
how well the vehicles are utilized for profit.  
The 2014 cost of living data was extracted from the Council for Community and Economic Research website 
(The Council for Community and Economic Research, 2014). The Cost of Living Index (COLI) is used to control for 
the cost of life in each city. Wages and maintenance can be more costly in cities like New York or Chicago and lower 
in smaller cities like Columbus, OH. These differences in operating expenses could affect the result of the regression 
and are therefore controlled for with the Cost Of Living Index.  
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The size of the agency could also have an influence on the efficiency with large agencies spending more in 
administrative expenses while smaller agencies could spend a larger share of their revenue in maintenance. The 
agency size was accounted for using the number of vehicles operated in annual maximum service (VOMS).  
The unionization rate was collected from the Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current 
Population Survey (Hirsch, 2014). The unionization rate was used to account for potential differences in bus 
operators’ wages. Agencies with unions are more likely to pay their drivers more, therefore the operation expenses 
would be higher regardless of the efficiency of the agency. The unionization rates for the public and private sectors 
were collected for each MSA included in this study.  
The population density data was extracted from the National Transit Database and is used to account for the 
differences in the operating environment. Denser cities are assumed to be more cost efficient than sprawling cities. 
That variable helps controlling for service demand when using the farebox recovery ratio as a dependent variable.  
The precipitation data was extracted from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration database of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce (United States Department of Commerce, 2010). The data represents the 30-year 
average (1981-2010) for precipitation in inches. The data was collected for each cities included in this study.  
The population and service area data were also extracted from NTD and was used in the calculation to 
determine the density of the study area.  
Finally, the peak hour data was collected from the national transit database. Cities with lower peaking in their 
operations or without peak period are assumed to have lower expenses compared to the rest of the agencies that 
have an under-utilized bus fleet used to serve peak periods.  
The last variable included that was not recorded in McCullough study is the number of competitors that each 
agency has. That data was extracted from the NTD has both an absolute value with an exact count of competitors 
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and also as dichotomous dummy variables (competitors or no competitors). The variables and their expected 
influence on the dependent variables are summarized in Table 1 below. 
NAME DESCRIPTION INFLUENCE 
DEPENDENT   
EFFICIENCY Operations’ Efficiency  
5YR_AVERAGEFBRECOVERYRATIO Farebox Recovery Ratio  
INDEPENDENT   
VOMS Vehicle Operated in Maximum Service  
COLI Cost of Living Index - 
PRECIPITATION Rain Precipitation (inches) + 
UNION Unionization Rate (% of pop) + 
SERVICEAREAPOP Population in the Service Area - 
SERVICEAREASQMI Service Area in Square Miles - 
SERVICEAREADEN Service Area Population Density - 
ISDO Dummy variable for Directly Operated Transit + 
ISPT Dummy variable for Purchased Transit - 
ISMIXED Dummy variable for Mixed Type of Service - 
COMPETITORS Number of Competitors - 
COMPETITORS_DUMVARYES Dummy Variable for the presence of Competitors - 
COMPETITORS_DUMVARNO Dummy Variable for the absence of Competitors + 
RH_RATIO Scheduling Efficiency - 
PK2BASE Magnitude of the Peak Service + 
Table 2 – Regression Variables Descriptive Statistics and Expected Signs 
ANALYSIS 
To test the hypothesis that agencies contracting-out part or the entirety of their bus services are more efficient 
than agencies that do not, a multiple regression using the aforementioned dataset was performed. The first model 
that was used is very similar to the McCullough’s ones with the restrictions mentioned earlier, it is used to assess 
whether the situation has changed in 20 years. In 1988, McCullough et al. did not prove that the type of service 







Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std Error of the 
Estimate 
1 0.821a 0.674 0.607 18.69134327 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Is DO, VOMS, PK2BASE, Precipitation, Union, RH_RATIO, service area(sqmi), COLI, 
Is mixed, service area pop, Service area density. 
Table 3 - Model 1 Summary 
The model’s R2 is 0.607 compared to an R2 of 0.84 for McCullough’s model. That means 60.7% of the variation 
of the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. Table 3 describes the effect of each variable in 
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a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency 
Table 4 - Model 1 Variables' coefficients 
The scheduling efficiency, cost of living index, vehicle at maximum operated service, unionization rate are significant 
at the 95% confidence level while the peak-to-base ratio and dummy variable for mixed type of service are 
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insignificant with a value greater than 0.05. The collinearity table does not show any sign of multicollinearity between 
the variables (See Appendix C). RH_RATIO seems to have the largest impact on the efficiency measure. In this 
model, each increase of 0.01% in RH_RATIO yields a change of $ - 2.316/Hr in efficiency. In other terms, the lower 
the number of hours not in revenue hour the higher the efficiency. These results are very similar to what McCullough 
found in 1998 with the same significant variables except for the ones that were not included in this updated model 
(Vehicle size and Labor utilization). These two missing variables could explain the slightly lower adjusted R2 value of 
this updated model. This model also fails to prove that efficiency in a transit agency is influenced by the type of 
contract. The first conclusion that can be drawn from this first model is that it does not seem that practices have 
evolved too much in transit agencies and the same variables seem to be predominant in determining an agency’s 
efficiency. The model also proves himself to be a reliable update of the 1998’s model. Therefore the work of 
McCullough et al. can be used as a basis to build other models and further their research.  
The next model uses the same independent variables but replaces the dependent variables by the farebox recovery 
ratio. The hypothesis is that the farebox recovery ratio might be a better measure for efficiency. Table 4 and 5 below 
summarize the results of that 2nd model. 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .521a .272 .123 .0815883234 
Predictors: (Constant), Is DO, VOMS, PK2BASE, Precipitation, Union, RH_RATIO, service area (sqmi), COLI, Is mixed, 
service area pop, Service area density 
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Dependent Variable: 5 Years average FBRecovRatio 
Table 6 - Model 2 Variables' coefficients 
This second model confirms the theory of McCullough (1998) that the farebox recovery ratio is not a good measure of 
efficiency while “Revenue hour normalizes operating conditions […] removes regional and modal biases in producing 
transit service”. That model returns a really low adjusted R2 of 0.123 with most of the variables being insignificant at 
the 90% confidence level. Given the results of this 2nd model the other regressions will use the efficiency measure 
rather than the farebox recovery ratio as a dependent variable. 
Preston and Almutairi (2014) suggested that ‘competition for the market is preferable to competition in the market’. 
This hypothesis could explain why there are beliefs that purchased transit leads to cost effectiveness, not because of 
contracting out itself but because it introduces competition. The 3rd model tests that hypothesis by introducing a 
competition variable into the model. If the model R2 is high enough and if the competition variable is significant then 




Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .830a .689 .611 18.61040109 
Predictos: (constant), PK2BASE, Is PT, service area (sqmi), Competitors Dummy Variable, COLI, Precipitation, Competitors, 
Union, RH_RATIO, Is mixed, VOMS, service area pop, Service area density 
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Dependent Variable: Efficiency 
Table 8 - Model 3, Variables' coefficients 
The model’s R2 is 0.611, it is a slight improvement from McCullough’s model. Despite a greater R2 the model does 
not proves the hypothesis that competition leads to an increased cost efficiency. The ‘competitors dummy variable’ is 
not significant in that model with a significance of 0.935. An analysis of the average efficiency for agencies that have 
competitors against those that do not have competitors supports that finding. The agencies without competitors have 
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an operating cost per hour of $110 on average while agencies with competitors have an operating cost of $122 per 
hour on average. Once again, RH_RATIO, COLI and Union come out as the most significant variables in the model. 
Both the VIF table and multicollinearity diagnostic show that there is no significant collinearity problem between the 
variables in the model. The B values show that RH_RATIO is by far the best explanatory variable in the model with a 
value of -231.02. That means that all other variable held constant an increase of 0.01% in RH_RATIO would lead to a 
decrease of $2.31/hour in operating expenses. The ‘Is PT’ variable is significant at the 90% confidence level meaning 
that purchased transportation type of service is more efficient by $18/Hr when looking at the efficiency variable. This 
model fails justifying the effect of competition on efficiency but it made the type of service variable significant at the 
90% confidence level, demonstrating that all held constant and compared to directly operated service, purchased 
transportation increases the efficiency by $18 an per hour.  
The dataset shows that none of the 23 less efficient agencies’ bus services are 100% purchased transit. The 
averages for efficiency values tend to confirm that trend. The average efficiency for directly operated services is 
$120/Hr. and $98/Hr. for agencies that contract out 100% of their bus services. That is a difference of $22/Hr which is 
close to the $18/Hr. from the regression’s output. The most expensive seems to be the mixed category with a value 
of $127/Hr. 
Table 8 below shows the 10 most efficient agencies of the data set. The ranking is based on the revenue-hour 




Table 9 - Top 10 of Most Efficient Agencies in the dataset 
The top 10 (out of a total of 68) agencies do not seem to show any of the pattern reflected by the 
regression’s outcome regarding competition of type of service. 5 of the agencies have competition. 5 agencies are a 
‘DO’ while the remaining ones are ‘PT’ or ‘Mixed’. However, the RH_RATIO is above 90% for all of them. It was also 
one of the most significant variable in the regression’s outcome. The farebox recovery ratio (FB_Recovery) is low for 
most of the agencies. That means this agencies do not get a lot of revenue from the fares and use it optimally, has 
shown by the RH_RATIO values. 
CONCLUSION 
Multiple studies have analyzed the United Kingdom’s experience in privatizing transit systems. Most studies 
concluded that privatization seemed to improve the efficiency of public transportation agencies. However, recent and 
older studies fail at accurately putting a number on that improvement. Several studies reviewed in the literature 
review provide really wide ranges to describe the gain in efficiency some going as wide as 5% - 61%. These wide 
ranges can lead to question the actual effect of privatization on the public transit systems. The literature review has 
clearly highlighted the complexity of the relationships between the variables that can potentially affect cost efficiency. 
In addition to the type of service (Directly Operated, Mixed or Purchased Transit), this study looked at the effect of 
competition on efficiency. The addition of the competition variable in the model made the ‘purchased transit’ type of 
Name State VOMS TOS
Efficiency_
Measure
COLI Union Is DO FB_Recovery Competitors
RH_
RATIO
LACMTA ‐ Small Operators(LACMTA) CA 184 PT 65.2 136.4 8 0 0.11 1 0.93
Toledo Area Regional Transit Authority(TARTA) OH 78 DO 74.1 94.3 52.8 1 0.21 0 0.91
City of Tempe Transit Division ‐ dba Valley Metro(TIM ‐
Tempe in Motion)
AZ 106 PT 76.0 100.7 ? 0 0.13 1 0.93
Interurban Transit Partnership(The Rapid) MI 126 DO 78.1 90.7 47.2 1 0.17 0 0.96
Mass Transit Department ‐ City of El Paso(Sun Metro) TX 124 DO 78.5 90.4 22.2 1 0.19 1 0.96
Transportation District Commission of Hampton 
Roads, dba: Hampton Roads Transit(HRT)
VA 234 DO 80.6 111.7 16.2 1 0.23 0 0.99
Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority(PSTA) FL 173 Mixed 82.6 92.4 21.7 0 0.27 1 0.93
VIA Metropolitan Transit(VIA) TX 352 DO 83.0 95.7 15.6 1 0.17 0 0.95
Riverside Transit Agency(RTA) CA 117 Mixed 83.7 112.5 54.6 0 0.21 1 0.92
City of Tucson(COT) AZ 210 DO 84.8 96.5 16.5 1 0.22 0 0.93
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service variable significant at the 90% confidence level and showed an improvement of $18/hr. compared to directly 
operated transit. This was also confirmed by the analyses of each type of service groups’ averages. The model’s R2 
of 0.61 has moderate explaining power and the outcomes should be interpreted carefully. The purchased 
transportation variable is only significant at the 90% confidence level which would be considered the lowest 
acceptable. Looking at the top 10 most efficient agencies did not reveal a trend regarding competition or type of 
service. While the question of whether competition and type of service affect the performance of an agency remains, 
it is safe to say that if it does the effects are lower than other variables such as scheduling. The model has shown 
that greater savings can be accomplished by improving the scheduling. Each reduction of 1% in the vehicle revenue 
hours to vehicle-hours ratio yields a saving of approximately $2.31 per hour in efficiency. Improving scheduling is a 
measure that any agency can focus on while contracting can yield great benefits in some very particular cases but 
should not be applied as a general rule by transit agencies. The $18 savings per hour given by the model when 
comparing purchased transportation to directly operated transportation might be mostly explained by the fact that 
drivers tend to be paid significantly less in the private sector. Purchasing some transportation can be the solution for 
some agencies but as it was highlighted in the literature review, the contracts should be carefully written and 
monitored as well as revised frequently to gain the most benefits out of the transaction. Competition was believed to 
be stimulating for transit agencies and to make them become more efficient in the fear of losing market shares. There 
was no evidence of competition being an explanatory variable to the model. It might be due to the fact that 
competition comes at a price which might be reflected in the expenses and therefore in the efficiency of the agency.  
The finding suggests that policies encouraging more competition in the market will have little effect on the public 
transit agencies’ revenue. As it was shown in the literature review it might have a negative effect and degrade the 
working condition of many of the operators. As explained earlier, private operators tend to pay their employees less 
than public agencies. The cost of policies opening up the barriers to entry on the public transportation market would 
be too costly to implement when taking into account the amount of regulation and control that would be needed 




In order to confirm the limited influence of contracting-out on transit agencies bus services’ efficiency it would be 
useful to try to collect more data for agencies themselves in order to build a larger data set. The current dataset is 
only composed of 68 agencies and some of the results could be slightly off due to a fairly small dataset. Agencies 
should also be interviewed to know the exact nature of their contracts with third party transportation providers. As 
explained in the literature review there are several different ways of contracting transportation services out and the 
type of contract could be a new variable to add to this research. 
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9032  AZ  392  PT 
City of Tempe Transit Division ‐ dba Valley Metro(TIM ‐ Tempe 
in Motion) 
9172  AZ  106  PT 
City of Tucson(COT)  9033  AZ  210  DO 
Regional Public Transportation Authority, dba: Valley 
Metro(RPTA) 
9136  AZ  170  PT 
Foothill Transit  9146  CA  266  PT 
Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation 
District(GGBHTD) 
9016  CA  166  Mixed 
LACMTA ‐ Small Operators(LACMTA)  9166  CA  184  PT 
Long Beach Transit(LBT)  9023  CA  182  DO 
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
dba: Metro(LACMTA) 
9154  CA  1860  Mixed 
Orange County Transportation Authority(OCTA)  9036  CA  428  Mixed 
Riverside Transit Agency(RTA)  9031  CA  117  Mixed 
Sacramento Regional Transit District(Sacramento RT)  9019  CA  158  DO 
San Diego Metropolitan Transit System(MTS)  9026  CA  414  Mixed 
San Francisco Municipal Railway(MUNI)  9015  CA  388  DO 
San Mateo County Transit District(SamTrans)  9009  CA  265  Mixed 
Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority(VTA)  9013  CA  371  Mixed 
Santa Monica's Big Blue Bus(Big Blue Bus )  9008  CA  152  DO 
Denver Regional Transportation District(RTD)  8006  CO  819  Mixed 
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority(WMATA)  3030  DC  1338  Mixed 
Delaware Transit Corporation(DTC)  3075  DE  187  Mixed 
Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority(HART)  4041  FL  158  DO 
Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority(PSTA)  4027  FL  173  Mixed 
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority(MARTA)  4022  GA  446  DO 
City and County of Honolulu Department of Transportation 
Services(DTS) 
9002  HI  433  PT 
Chicago Transit Authority(CTA)  5066  IL  1,663  DO 
Pace ‐ Suburban Bus Division(PACE)  5113  IL  600  Mixed 
Transit Authority of River City(TARC)  4018  KY  178  Mixed 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority(MBTA)  1003  MA  784  Mixed 
Pioneer Valley Transit Authority(PVTA)  1008  MA  137  PT 
Ride‐On Montgomery County Transit  3051  MD  281  DO 
City of Detroit Department of Transportation(DDOT)  5119  MI  223  DO 





5031  MI  229  Mixed 
Metro Transit  5027  MN  766  DO 
Metropolitan Council  5154  MN  313  PT 
Kansas City Area Transportation Authority(KCATA)  7005  MO  197  DO 
Charlotte Area Transit System(CATS)  4008  NC  268  DO 
New Jersey Transit Corporation(NJ TRANSIT)  2080  NJ  2029  Mixed 
Regional Transportation Commission of Southern Nevada(RTC)  9045  NV  308  PT 
CNY Centro, Inc. (CNY Centro )  2018  NY  123  DO 
MTA Bus Company(MTABUS)  2188  NY  1,075  DO 
MTA New York City Transit(NYCT)  2008  NY  3,306  DO 
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority(NFT Metro)  2004  NY  269  DO 
Regional Transit Service, Inc. and Lift Line, Inc.(R‐GRTA)  2113  NY  213  DO 
Suffolk County Department of Public Works ‐ Transportation 
Division(ST) 
2072  NY  131  PT 
Central Ohio Transit Authority(COTA)  5016  OH  261  DO 
Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority(SORTA / Metro)  5012  OH  297  DO 
The Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority(GCRTA)  5015  OH  350  DO 
Toledo Area Regional Transit Authority(TARTA)  5022  OH  78  DO 
Tri‐County Metropolitan Transportation District of 
Oregon(TriMet) 
0008  OR  505  DO 
Port Authority of Allegheny County(Port Authority)  3022  PA  568  DO 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority(SEPTA)  3019  PA  1,172  DO 
Metropolitan Bus Authority(MBA)  4086  PR  114  DO 
Rhode Island Public Transit Authority(RIPTA)  1001  RI  192  DO 
Memphis Area Transit Authority(MATA)  4003  TN  120  DO 
Metropolitan Transit Authority(MTA)  4004  TN  137  DO 
Dallas Area Rapid Transit(DART)  6056  TX  527  DO 
Fort Worth Transportation Authority(The T)  6007  TX  133  Mixed 
Mass Transit Department ‐ City of El Paso(Sun Metro)  6006  TX  124  DO 
Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County, Texas(Metro)  6008  TX  766  Mixed 
VIA Metropolitan Transit(VIA)  6011  TX  352  DO 
Fairfax Connector Bus System(Fairfax Connector)  3068  VA  207  PT 
Transportation District Commission of Hampton Roads, dba: 
Hampton Roads Transit(HRT) 
3083  VA  234  DO 
King County Department of Transportation ‐ Metro Transit 
Division(King County Metro) 
0001  WA  984  Mixed 
Pierce County Transportation Benefit Area Authority(Pierce 
Transit) 
0003  WA  106  DO 
Spokane Transit Authority(STA)  0002  WA  114  DO 
Metro Transit System(Metro)  5005  WI  175  DO 
Milwaukee County Transit System(MCTS)  5008  WI  321  DO 
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PK2BASE Is mixed Is DO 
1 1 8.508 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 1.380 2.483 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .03 .00 .05 .02 
3 .892 3.088 .00 .00 .00 .06 .00 .05 .00 .03 .01 .00 .02 .00 
4 .461 4.296 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .05 .01 .03 .11 .00 .13 .02 
5 .190 6.686 .00 .00 .00 .17 .24 .03 .15 .00 .15 .01 .04 .00 
6 .188 6.730 .00 .00 .00 .13 .17 .04 .00 .02 .05 .06 .19 .09 
7 .112 8.734 .00 .00 .00 .47 .02 .10 .26 .19 .00 .09 .12 .04 
8 .107 8.913 .00 .00 .00 .08 .07 .19 .02 .60 .49 .06 .01 .00 
9 .081 10.248 .00 .00 .00 .01 .25 .01 .43 .01 .03 .08 .30 .45 
1
0 
.069 11.066 .00 .00 .01 .00 .09 .02 .12 .03 .02 .50 .00 .00 
1
1 
.010 28.748 .01 .02 .97 .06 .16 .43 .00 .06 .01 .02 .10 .34 
1
2 
.001 122.507 .99 .98 .00 .00 .01 .05 .00 .00 .10 .19 .05 .03 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency 
 
